University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 11 27 2019 03 21 Carnap's Paradox and Ontological Second Level Skepticism Carnap's Paradox and Ontological Second Level Skepticism 183 196 23674 10.22108/mph.2018.112764.1125 FA Mohammad Hosein Esfandiari Philosophy, Literature and Human Scince, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2018 09 08 To say that “there is a prime number greater than a hundred” implies “there are numbers”. It seems that Carnap accepts the former and rejects the latter. How? And if his view on ontology, more exactly on metaontology, effects such a result, should we think of his view as paradoxical? The author don’t agree on the light of dividing ontologists in three categories. Indeed, there are two genuine question in ontology: “what is there?” And, “what is the criterion of existence?” Ontologists in the first category think that the answer of the first question stands on the answer of the second question. I call them ‘metodologist’. Ontologists in the second category, ‘particularist’, think that the answer of the second question stands on the answer of the first. Ontologists in the third category radically reject the possibility of answering to those questions. I call this category ‘ontological second level skepticism’ and attribute it to Carnap. Finally, I demonstrate how by this attribution Carnap’s view is not paradoxical. On the other hand, by putting Carnap in the ‘Refer-Without-Tears’ camp, in opposite of ‘inconvenience refer’ camp, I show how he refers without ontological concerns. To say that “there is a prime number greater than a hundred” implies “there are numbers”. It seems that Carnap accepts the former and rejects the latter. How? And if his view on ontology, more exactly on metaontology, effects such a result, should we think of his view as paradoxical? The author don’t agree on the light of dividing ontologists in three categories. Indeed, there are two genuine question in ontology: “what is there?” And, “what is the criterion of existence?” Ontologists in the first category think that the answer of the first question stands on the answer of the second question. I call them ‘metodologist’. Ontologists in the second category, ‘particularist’, think that the answer of the second question stands on the answer of the first. Ontologists in the third category radically reject the possibility of answering to those questions. I call this category ‘ontological second level skepticism’ and attribute it to Carnap. Finally, I demonstrate how by this attribution Carnap’s view is not paradoxical. On the other hand, by putting Carnap in the ‘Refer-Without-Tears’ camp, in opposite of ‘inconvenience refer’ camp, I show how he refers without ontological concerns. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_23674_e0a2e4be26f79fa59ec2d049eb0e2572.pdf