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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>11</Volume>
				<Issue>28</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Metaethical reflections on Audi’s Divine Command theory</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Metaethical reflections on Audi’s Divine Command theory</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>81</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>96</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">24338</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/mph.2020.118236.1181</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Bahram</FirstName>
					<LastName>Alizade</LastName>
<Affiliation>Department of Philosophy
Kharazmi University</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>28</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>There are two main criticisms that are brought against any divine command theory (DCT); namely DCT undermines the autonomy of morality and DCT puts morality on an arbitrary foundation. Audi has suggested that these two problems can be avoided by adopting the a priori groundedness view of DCT. He takes the property of being obligatory to be identical to the property of being divinely commanded (commandable) arguing that both of them supervene on non-moral (natural) properties. The grounding of moral properties on natural ones is a priori as well as necessary. So, basic moral principles are necessary truths and necessary truths are not determined by the Divine Will. It means that we can know moral concepts independent of theological ones. This study is an attempt to show that, Audi’s DCT is inconsistent with the well-known and highly plausible view of God’s free-command thesis. For this purpose, I used Murphy’s trilemma against the property identity version of the divine command theory.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">There are two main criticisms that are brought against any divine command theory (DCT); namely DCT undermines the autonomy of morality and DCT puts morality on an arbitrary foundation. Audi has suggested that these two problems can be avoided by adopting the a priori groundedness view of DCT. He takes the property of being obligatory to be identical to the property of being divinely commanded (commandable) arguing that both of them supervene on non-moral (natural) properties. The grounding of moral properties on natural ones is a priori as well as necessary. So, basic moral principles are necessary truths and necessary truths are not determined by the Divine Will. It means that we can know moral concepts independent of theological ones. This study is an attempt to show that, Audi’s DCT is inconsistent with the well-known and highly plausible view of God’s free-command thesis. For this purpose, I used Murphy’s trilemma against the property identity version of the divine command theory.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Divine command theory</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Commandability</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">supervenience</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">obligatoriness</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">natural properties</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_24338_ef9cb80c53aef8b43783580ba02c99b0.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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