University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 11 28 2019 11 22 Moore's Paradox and Analysis of Moore's Account of the Paradox Moore's Paradox and Analysis of Moore's Account of the Paradox 117 134 24522 10.22108/mph.2020.118330.1183 FA Seyed Ali Kalantari Associate professor, Department of philosophy, faculty of literature and Humanity, University of Isfahan, Iran Ruhollah Ebrahimpour Esfahani Master of philosophy of logic, Department of philosophy, Faculty of literature and Humanity, University of Isfahan, Iran Journal Article 2019 07 29 Georg Edward Moore realized that although sentences like "p but I do not believe that p" and "p but I do believe that ~p" can have true content, their assertion can be absurd and paradoxical. Moreover, he realized that asserting the sentences in third-person or past tense forms are not absurd. Later on, it became clear that the sentences are not assertible nor truly believable. In this paper we will first introduce the most important features of the sentences; we will then, along with clarifying Moore's account for accommodating the sentences, argue that there are at least four criticisms against Moore's account and thus it is not tenable.  <br />  Georg Edward Moore realized that although sentences like "p but I do not believe that p" and "p but I do believe that ~p" can have true content, their assertion can be absurd and paradoxical. Moreover, he realized that asserting the sentences in third-person or past tense forms are not absurd. Later on, it became clear that the sentences are not assertible nor truly believable. In this paper we will first introduce the most important features of the sentences; we will then, along with clarifying Moore's account for accommodating the sentences, argue that there are at least four criticisms against Moore's account and thus it is not tenable.  <br />  https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_24522_beb5ed1796fdd083e2534aac766ea765.pdf