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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>11</Volume>
				<Issue>28</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Normativity of logic</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Normativity of logic</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>181</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>196</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">24873</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/mph.2020.115510.1145</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Masoud</FirstName>
					<LastName>Alvand</LastName>
<Affiliation>phd student of logic,university of Isfahan, faculty of philosophy</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Logic tells us what come from a set of propositions, as premises; it tells us when our arguments are valid. And logic can show us the inconsistency of our theories. The claim is that, in addition, logic requires us to believe in the implications of our beliefs and to disregard inconsistent beliefs. So, it seems that logic, except for studying the validity of the arguments, have special merit. This particular position, which is called normativity of logic, issues requirements for thinking as such, and distinguishes it from other sciences. Frege is one of the advocates normativity of logic, which sees logic, as Ethics, as normative science; but Harman argues that logic does not interfere in the evaluation and guidance of everyday human reasoning. Meanwhile, MacFarlane, with the exact expression of the problem of normativity of logic, seeks to make the slightest form of the problem, but Field with an essentially normative conception of the implication tries to avoid any barrier to the normativity of logic.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Logic tells us what come from a set of propositions, as premises; it tells us when our arguments are valid. And logic can show us the inconsistency of our theories. The claim is that, in addition, logic requires us to believe in the implications of our beliefs and to disregard inconsistent beliefs. So, it seems that logic, except for studying the validity of the arguments, have special merit. This particular position, which is called normativity of logic, issues requirements for thinking as such, and distinguishes it from other sciences. Frege is one of the advocates normativity of logic, which sees logic, as Ethics, as normative science; but Harman argues that logic does not interfere in the evaluation and guidance of everyday human reasoning. Meanwhile, MacFarlane, with the exact expression of the problem of normativity of logic, seeks to make the slightest form of the problem, but Field with an essentially normative conception of the implication tries to avoid any barrier to the normativity of logic.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Bridge principle</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_24873_e794ef5d6103dad0a759f3b79e6bc73b.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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