University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 12 29 2020 03 20 The Extended Mind: Objections and limitations The Extended Mind: Objections and limitations 79 94 25067 10.22108/mph.2020.122771.1216 FA Peyman Pourghannad PhD in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2020 05 09 The main idea embedded in the hypothesis of the extended mind is that the mind is not confined to the body or the nervous system. This hypothesis asserts that contrary to the traditional (physicalist) view, according to which the boundaries of the mind correspond to the boundaries of the brain (or the body), mental and cognitive states <em>can be</em> extended beyond the boundaries of the nervous system (or the body). In this paper, I will try to deal with the hypothesis and the arguments in its favor. Also, I will try to focus on some of its problems and limitations. An objection raised in this paper against this thesis is inspired by a widely-known argument called “epistemic argument”. According to this objection, phenomenal states cannot be attributed to “hybrid systems”, systems constituted by both the nervous system and environmental components. I will argue that the hypothesis of the extended mind, at best, conceptually excludes conscious states. Consequently, it is not obvious at all that, given this substantial conceptual limitation, to what extent the advocates of this hypothesis are entitled to claim that their application of the term “mind” still semantically overlap with the referent of traditional view’s proponents sufficiently. Another objection appeals to the fact that, regarding scientific explanation and prediction, the traditional concept of the mind has shown fruitful whereas the concept of extended mind is unlikely to readily yield numerous law-like regularities.   The main idea embedded in the hypothesis of the extended mind is that the mind is not confined to the body or the nervous system. This hypothesis asserts that contrary to the traditional (physicalist) view, according to which the boundaries of the mind correspond to the boundaries of the brain (or the body), mental and cognitive states <em>can be</em> extended beyond the boundaries of the nervous system (or the body). In this paper, I will try to deal with the hypothesis and the arguments in its favor. Also, I will try to focus on some of its problems and limitations. An objection raised in this paper against this thesis is inspired by a widely-known argument called “epistemic argument”. According to this objection, phenomenal states cannot be attributed to “hybrid systems”, systems constituted by both the nervous system and environmental components. I will argue that the hypothesis of the extended mind, at best, conceptually excludes conscious states. Consequently, it is not obvious at all that, given this substantial conceptual limitation, to what extent the advocates of this hypothesis are entitled to claim that their application of the term “mind” still semantically overlap with the referent of traditional view’s proponents sufficiently. Another objection appeals to the fact that, regarding scientific explanation and prediction, the traditional concept of the mind has shown fruitful whereas the concept of extended mind is unlikely to readily yield numerous law-like regularities.   https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_25067_11098049cc40d0f6cededae056e8e90c.pdf