University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 12 30 2020 09 22 Special Relativity against McTaggart's argument on the unreality of time Special Relativity against McTaggart's argument on the unreality of time 187 207 25828 10.22108/mph.2021.126054.1253 FA Mohammad Ebrahim Maghsoudi Ph.D. Student. Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2020 12 03 McTaggart has argued that any attempt to obtain a consistent mathematical description of the passage of time is doomed to failure: complicating tenses does not eliminate contradiction, rather pushes it back to a more complicated tensed expression. I will argue that one could avoid the hierarchical contradictions in McTaggart's argument against the reality of time: it would be enough to use appropriate semantic models for dealing with tensed sentences, and for placing an order which determines their sequence of truth. Then, I would also argue that there is no meaningful distinction between McTaggart's A and B series, and that the A series requires the B series. Finally, I will introduce the special relativistic correspondence of the McTaggart's series, and argue that Minkowski space-time provides us the frame for constructing the semantic model needed to address temporal expressions in a way that avoids McTaggart's contradictions. Thus it is shown that in the special relativistic description of time, i.e. the Minkowskian model, some of the premises of McTaggart's argument are false; As a result, his argument is not sound. McTaggart has argued that any attempt to obtain a consistent mathematical description of the passage of time is doomed to failure: complicating tenses does not eliminate contradiction, rather pushes it back to a more complicated tensed expression. I will argue that one could avoid the hierarchical contradictions in McTaggart's argument against the reality of time: it would be enough to use appropriate semantic models for dealing with tensed sentences, and for placing an order which determines their sequence of truth. Then, I would also argue that there is no meaningful distinction between McTaggart's A and B series, and that the A series requires the B series. Finally, I will introduce the special relativistic correspondence of the McTaggart's series, and argue that Minkowski space-time provides us the frame for constructing the semantic model needed to address temporal expressions in a way that avoids McTaggart's contradictions. Thus it is shown that in the special relativistic description of time, i.e. the Minkowskian model, some of the premises of McTaggart's argument are false; As a result, his argument is not sound. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_25828_1f662ca6af8a25fa9a8b61041b92be11.pdf