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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>13</Volume>
				<Issue>32</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2021</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>23</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Physicalism, Fundamentality and Modern Physics</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Physicalism, Fundamentality and Modern Physics</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>75</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>88</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">26485</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/mph.2022.131184.1355</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Aboutorab</FirstName>
					<LastName>Yaghmaie</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Science The Institute for Science and Technology Studies (ISTS) Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2021</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Broadly speaking, physicalism says the world consists of just the two types of entities: those posited by physics and those related, in some sense, to them. This relation is not symmetric in such a way that the former class has some sort of ontological priority to the latter. This article aims to show physicalism defined in terms of this relation, which I call the “fundamentality relation”, is not tenable if the picture of the world depicted by modern physics is taken seriously. Particularly, it will be argued that the dualities involved in quantum field theory imply the fundamentality relation to be a relative notion. Physicalism also becomes incoherent when the fundamentality relation is defined on symmetry structures of quantum theory. These among other arguments show that an alternative formulation of physicalism is needed to be articulated. Toward the end of the paper, I shall discuss some of these alternatives.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Broadly speaking, physicalism says the world consists of just the two types of entities: those posited by physics and those related, in some sense, to them. This relation is not symmetric in such a way that the former class has some sort of ontological priority to the latter. This article aims to show physicalism defined in terms of this relation, which I call the “fundamentality relation”, is not tenable if the picture of the world depicted by modern physics is taken seriously. Particularly, it will be argued that the dualities involved in quantum field theory imply the fundamentality relation to be a relative notion. Physicalism also becomes incoherent when the fundamentality relation is defined on symmetry structures of quantum theory. These among other arguments show that an alternative formulation of physicalism is needed to be articulated. Toward the end of the paper, I shall discuss some of these alternatives.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">fundamentality</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Quantum Mechanics</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">quantum field theory</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">general relativity</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">symmetry</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_26485_1e780dfa2bd037effa923f7b47cffc6e.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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