University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 15 35 2023 03 21 Can mental substance hold some physical properties? Assessing Jonathon Lowe's view Can mental substance hold some physical properties? Assessing Jonathon Lowe's view 121 137 27339 10.22108/mph.2022.134855.1438 FA Mohammad Mehdipour PhD of philosophy of Religion,,Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Journal Article 2022 08 30 The main problem of Cartesian Dualism which turns it to an outdated view is mental causation; If mental and physical substance have no mutual property, how we could explain the causal relation between them. Jonathan Lowe reconsiders Cartesian view and introduces his Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism which maintains that I, as a subject of my own experiences, literally can have some physical properties of my body. However, I think his afford is not consequent; By introducing a distinction between negative and positive possibility, first I argue that he needs positive possibility for his view. But as he committed to this idea that the identity of a property depends, at least in part, on its substance, he cannot use the idea of having a property derivatively to show this possibility. However, by resorting to the idea of spatiality of mind, I think we can maintain his core idea and believe that mind literally could has some physical properties. At the end, I will also try to answer to Kim's critiques about the idea of spatiality of mind. The main problem of Cartesian Dualism which turns it to an outdated view is mental causation; If mental and physical substance have no mutual property, how we could explain the causal relation between them. Jonathan Lowe reconsiders Cartesian view and introduces his Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism which maintains that I, as a subject of my own experiences, literally can have some physical properties of my body. However, I think his afford is not consequent; By introducing a distinction between negative and positive possibility, first I argue that he needs positive possibility for his view. But as he committed to this idea that the identity of a property depends, at least in part, on its substance, he cannot use the idea of having a property derivatively to show this possibility. However, by resorting to the idea of spatiality of mind, I think we can maintain his core idea and believe that mind literally could has some physical properties. At the end, I will also try to answer to Kim's critiques about the idea of spatiality of mind. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_27339_d2504f2122254e5fc16658fc885fe647.pdf