University of Isfahan Metaphysics 2476-3276 17 40 2025 09 23 Frege and Modal Concepts Frege and Modal Concepts 1 12 29158 10.22108/mph.2025.141373.1560 FA Fereshteh Nabati Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages Allameh Tabatabaei University, Thran, Iran Journal Article 2024 05 04 Frege in Begriffsschrift says that modal concepts have no place in logic. Of course, he provides definitions for these concepts to explain how to use them in language but his definitions face two problems. First, they do not maintain the usual connections between the concepts of necessity and possibility, and second, their difference between a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic concepts is unclear. Here, we present a version of Ferge's position on modal concepts, which firstly does not face these problems and secondly, is coherent with his other ideas and opinions. Frege doesn't use de re or de dicto modalities but considers modal concepts as properties of inferential relationship. Modal concepts express the characteristics of the inferential relationship. Still, just as it is impossible to talk about the inferential relationship in logic, there is no place to talk about its features in logic either. This reading, from Frege's point of view, preserves the traditional connection between the concepts of necessity and possibility and shows the difference between these concepts with a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic concepts. Frege in Begriffsschrift says that modal concepts have no place in logic. Of course, he provides definitions for these concepts to explain how to use them in language but his definitions face two problems. First, they do not maintain the usual connections between the concepts of necessity and possibility, and second, their difference between a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic concepts is unclear. Here, we present a version of Ferge's position on modal concepts, which firstly does not face these problems and secondly, is coherent with his other ideas and opinions. Frege doesn't use de re or de dicto modalities but considers modal concepts as properties of inferential relationship. Modal concepts express the characteristics of the inferential relationship. Still, just as it is impossible to talk about the inferential relationship in logic, there is no place to talk about its features in logic either. This reading, from Frege's point of view, preserves the traditional connection between the concepts of necessity and possibility and shows the difference between these concepts with a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic concepts. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29158_6b61f2f4499df015269a920b5ccafbb7.pdf