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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Suhrawardiâs Ideas about Syllogism</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Suhrawardiâs Ideas about Syllogism</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>10</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19153</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Z</FirstName>
					<LastName>Movahed</LastName>
<Affiliation>Professor Head of Logic Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>ShihÄb al-DÄ«n al-SuhrawardÄ« (d. 1194), in his most important book, Hikmat al-IshrÄq, claims that he has simplified the Aristotelian theory of syllogism by reducing its many rules to a few by which the validity of all moods can be proven. This is done by reducing all negative and particular categorical propositions to universal affirmative propositions and introducing two meta-language rules, one for the second and the other for the third figure. This article is an exposition of the non-modal part of his syllogism and an examination of his claim to simplifying the Aristotelian theory of syllogism.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">ShihÄb al-DÄ«n al-SuhrawardÄ« (d. 1194), in his most important book, Hikmat al-IshrÄq, claims that he has simplified the Aristotelian theory of syllogism by reducing its many rules to a few by which the validity of all moods can be proven. This is done by reducing all negative and particular categorical propositions to universal affirmative propositions and introducing two meta-language rules, one for the second and the other for the third figure. This article is an exposition of the non-modal part of his syllogism and an examination of his claim to simplifying the Aristotelian theory of syllogism.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Din Suhrawardi</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Aristotelian non</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19153_5b3465f692b830f1720f64218fe0ec4a.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>On the Possibility and Necessity of Critique of Judgment</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>On the Possibility and Necessity of Critique of Judgment</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>11</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>30</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19154</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>M</FirstName>
					<LastName>Gholamalian Dehaghani</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy, University of Isfahan</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The present article deals with two distinct subjects: 1) possibility and necessity of Kantâs third critique, 2) groundwork of this possibility and necessity. With regard to the first subject we will investigate fundamental role of theory of faculties of mind, cognitive faculties and division of philosophy in relation with mere possibility of third critique and then study its necessity according to the theory of transition. Eventually about second subject we examine important and basic role of two factors, namely reflective function and mere reflection, in order to show a complete picture of groundwork of possibility and necessity of third critique as a whole.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The present article deals with two distinct subjects: 1) possibility and necessity of Kantâs third critique, 2) groundwork of this possibility and necessity. With regard to the first subject we will investigate fundamental role of theory of faculties of mind, cognitive faculties and division of philosophy in relation with mere possibility of third critique and then study its necessity according to the theory of transition. Eventually about second subject we examine important and basic role of two factors, namely reflective function and mere reflection, in order to show a complete picture of groundwork of possibility and necessity of third critique as a whole.</OtherAbstract>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19154_f44a00788f7339f2a8deffd7b55d02c4.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Metaphysical Modality, Modality of Predicate and the Theory of</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Metaphysical Modality, Modality of Predicate and the Theory of</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>31</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>42</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19155</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>L</FirstName>
					<LastName>Nabavi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Aristotle in the Organon (1949: 9,30 a ,15-19) explicitly states that in a categorical syllogism when the minor premise is absolute (without modality operator) and the major is necessary, the conclusion will be necessary too. This Aristotle&#039;s view has been the source of many conflicts and disputes in the history of logic. The famous logicians and historians of logic in the twentieth century as &quot;Nicholas Rescher&quot; and &quot;Becker&quot; believe that Aristotle&#039;s view is justifiable and defensible (at least compared to the first figure) only if, the modality of major premise is considered as the property of predicate (modality de re). Today, we know very well that the modality of predicate is closely linked to Metaphysical and philosophical Modality. âShihab al-Din al- Suhrawardiâ in the theory of &quot;Decisive (Battateh) Necessityâ by accepting this base, explicitly states that, in the beginning, the modality must be mentioned as a part of the predicate and then the modality of relation or copula is summarized and reduced to necessity. The modern formalization of the most important part of this theory is as follows: &lt;br /&gt;(&quot;x) (Ã Ax Ã Ã  Bx) Âº (&quot;x) â¡ (Ã Ax Ã Ã  Bx) &lt;br /&gt;This paper discusses the historical overview of the metaphysical modality firstly and then shows that the theory of &quot;Decisive Necessityâ is true and justified in a model of modal logic with equivalent accessibility relation and homogeneous possible world view (fixed domain).</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Aristotle in the Organon (1949: 9,30 a ,15-19) explicitly states that in a categorical syllogism when the minor premise is absolute (without modality operator) and the major is necessary, the conclusion will be necessary too. This Aristotle&#039;s view has been the source of many conflicts and disputes in the history of logic. The famous logicians and historians of logic in the twentieth century as &quot;Nicholas Rescher&quot; and &quot;Becker&quot; believe that Aristotle&#039;s view is justifiable and defensible (at least compared to the first figure) only if, the modality of major premise is considered as the property of predicate (modality de re). Today, we know very well that the modality of predicate is closely linked to Metaphysical and philosophical Modality. âShihab al-Din al- Suhrawardiâ in the theory of &quot;Decisive (Battateh) Necessityâ by accepting this base, explicitly states that, in the beginning, the modality must be mentioned as a part of the predicate and then the modality of relation or copula is summarized and reduced to necessity. The modern formalization of the most important part of this theory is as follows: &lt;br /&gt;(&quot;x) (Ã Ax Ã Ã  Bx) Âº (&quot;x) â¡ (Ã Ax Ã Ã  Bx) &lt;br /&gt;This paper discusses the historical overview of the metaphysical modality firstly and then shows that the theory of &quot;Decisive Necessityâ is true and justified in a model of modal logic with equivalent accessibility relation and homogeneous possible world view (fixed domain).</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">metaphysical modality</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">theory of decisive necessity</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">homogeneous model of possible worlds</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19155_e0943e4adc5338ef60bc21c02a01f30c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Existence of Collection in Muslim Philosophersâ Viewpoint (With Emphasis on Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Existence of Collection in Muslim Philosophersâ Viewpoint (With Emphasis on Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>43</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>62</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19156</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>V</FirstName>
					<LastName>Khademzadeh</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD Candidate of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>M</FirstName>
					<LastName>Saeedi Mehr</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Concept of âcollectionâ as a group of things that lack real composition and do not end in a new situation and configuration is one of the fundamental elements of some philosophical problems. So, the issue concerning the mode of existence of collection can make direct effect on different philosophical subjects. Some Muslim philosophers believe that the collection possesses a real existence and others consider it as an ideational entity. Most Muslim philosophers assume that numbers are real accidents of concrete things and this view seems to be dependent on their belief in the real existence of the collection. On the other hand, some parts of arguments for the impossibility of infinite regress such as the argument from collection and the argument from middle and side assume the real existence of the collection as one of their hidden premises. In this paper, after the exposition of the problem, views of the opponents of real existence of the collection and their arguments are examined. In the next step, the relation of Russellâs paradox and the mode of the existence of collection is explained. We conclude that acceptance of real existence for the collection has controversial results that make some expressions like âthe collection of all existentsâ lack any reference.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Concept of âcollectionâ as a group of things that lack real composition and do not end in a new situation and configuration is one of the fundamental elements of some philosophical problems. So, the issue concerning the mode of existence of collection can make direct effect on different philosophical subjects. Some Muslim philosophers believe that the collection possesses a real existence and others consider it as an ideational entity. Most Muslim philosophers assume that numbers are real accidents of concrete things and this view seems to be dependent on their belief in the real existence of the collection. On the other hand, some parts of arguments for the impossibility of infinite regress such as the argument from collection and the argument from middle and side assume the real existence of the collection as one of their hidden premises. In this paper, after the exposition of the problem, views of the opponents of real existence of the collection and their arguments are examined. In the next step, the relation of Russellâs paradox and the mode of the existence of collection is explained. We conclude that acceptance of real existence for the collection has controversial results that make some expressions like âthe collection of all existentsâ lack any reference.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">number</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">infinite regress</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Mulla Sadra</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Ibn Sina</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Russell’s paradox</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19156_ff42ae9bc2cb828372719fbf7f53ed19.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Examination of Michael Dummettâs Anti-Realism and Verificationist Approach</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Examination of Michael Dummettâs Anti-Realism and Verificationist Approach</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>63</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>78</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19157</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>A</FirstName>
					<LastName>Hossein Khani</LastName>
<Affiliation>MA of Philosophy, Allameh Tabatabaee University</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett, the contemporary analytic philosopher. He has always preferred to discuss about statements and assertions (instead of entities), such as statements in the past tense, statements about the physical world, and so on. Based on his approach to metaphysical problems, we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to the statements. By doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning the statements may have. After criticizing the realist approach, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge on meaning and truth or falsity of linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, Dummett says, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against it. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there is no guarantee for every sentence to be certainly true (or false). Or, it cannot be approved for each statement to be necessarily true or false, independently of our knowledge and relevant abilities. An adherent of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and acknowledges that sentences are true or false because of the reality existing independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummettâs anti-realist approach and his criticisms on realism, I am going to discuss about and explain the correlation between his desired theory of meaning and anti-realism.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett, the contemporary analytic philosopher. He has always preferred to discuss about statements and assertions (instead of entities), such as statements in the past tense, statements about the physical world, and so on. Based on his approach to metaphysical problems, we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to the statements. By doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning the statements may have. After criticizing the realist approach, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge on meaning and truth or falsity of linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, Dummett says, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against it. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there is no guarantee for every sentence to be certainly true (or false). Or, it cannot be approved for each statement to be necessarily true or false, independently of our knowledge and relevant abilities. An adherent of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and acknowledges that sentences are true or false because of the reality existing independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummettâs anti-realist approach and his criticisms on realism, I am going to discuss about and explain the correlation between his desired theory of meaning and anti-realism.</OtherAbstract>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19157_46d0c4f251e7359d1b76e2692db5f8f2.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Role of Freedom in Kant's Philosophy of Ethics</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Role of Freedom in Kant&#039;s Philosophy of Ethics</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>79</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>92</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19158</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>M</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sayf</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor of Philosophy, International University of Imam Khomeini</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Freedom is a fundamental concept in Kant&#039;s philosophy, including theoretical and practical philosophy, though its role in the latter is more significant. In his philosophy of ethics Kant considers freedom as the basis of his reasoning for ethics and in order to rule out the view that considers ethics as illusion he maintains that if we possess a free will, then ethics will turn out to be real and ethical laws will be valid for all. &lt;br /&gt;This article is an attempt to study the role of freedom in Kant&#039;s philosophy of ethics with special reference to his two main books on practical reason, namely, The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Ethics and Critique of Practical Reason.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Freedom is a fundamental concept in Kant&#039;s philosophy, including theoretical and practical philosophy, though its role in the latter is more significant. In his philosophy of ethics Kant considers freedom as the basis of his reasoning for ethics and in order to rule out the view that considers ethics as illusion he maintains that if we possess a free will, then ethics will turn out to be real and ethical laws will be valid for all. &lt;br /&gt;This article is an attempt to study the role of freedom in Kant&#039;s philosophy of ethics with special reference to his two main books on practical reason, namely, The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Ethics and Critique of Practical Reason.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Kant</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">philosophy of ethics</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">freedom</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Will</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Autonomy</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">practical reason</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_19158_3565a25f90fa120e9b4464cf4eb765bf.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Metaphysics</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2476-3276</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Comparison of Aquinasâ and Mulla Sadra's Viewpoints about the Occurrence or Eternity of the World</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Comparison of Aquinasâ and Mulla Sadra&#039;s Viewpoints about the Occurrence or Eternity of the World</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>93</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>118</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19159</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>M</FirstName>
					<LastName>Zarei</LastName>
<Affiliation>MA of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Shiraz</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>S</FirstName>
					<LastName>Rahimian</LastName>
<Affiliation>MA of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Shiraz</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>This paper investigates the attitudes of two Islamic and Christian thinkers, Saint Aquinas and Mulla Sadra Shirazi, about occurrence and eternity hypothesis issue.
Aquinas faces two ideas. The first approach is eternity of the world based on Aristotle&#039;s theory and his followers another approach is the world temporal occurrence derived from Christian scriptures. Aquinas believes that the reasons presented for proving the world&#039;s occurrence are not convincing and therefore criticizes them. Although he accepts the universe occurrence he has a worshiping view to it and finally regards the world&#039;s eternity and occurrence as an antinomical problem.
In contrast, Mulla Sadra who has accepted the occurrence does not consider a starting point for the issue and in turn tries to prove it by Substantial Motion approach and therefore regardless of worship aspect of the issue and by employing a rational approach he gains a higher status than Aquinas.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">This paper investigates the attitudes of two Islamic and Christian thinkers, Saint Aquinas and Mulla Sadra Shirazi, about occurrence and eternity hypothesis issue.
Aquinas faces two ideas. The first approach is eternity of the world based on Aristotle&#039;s theory and his followers another approach is the world temporal occurrence derived from Christian scriptures. Aquinas believes that the reasons presented for proving the world&#039;s occurrence are not convincing and therefore criticizes them. Although he accepts the universe occurrence he has a worshiping view to it and finally regards the world&#039;s eternity and occurrence as an antinomical problem.
In contrast, Mulla Sadra who has accepted the occurrence does not consider a starting point for the issue and in turn tries to prove it by Substantial Motion approach and therefore regardless of worship aspect of the issue and by employing a rational approach he gains a higher status than Aquinas.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Occurrence</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">eternity</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">World</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Rationality</Param>
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