University of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923An investigation on the paradox of analysisAn investigation on the paradox of analysis1162283410.22108/mph.2018.100760.1000FASeyedaliKalantariUniversity of IsfahanZahraNematiUniversity of IsfahanJournal Article20161204"Conceptual analysis" is one of important analytic philosophers' tools in philosophical argumentations. In the process of analysis, we specify the elements or constituents of a concept on which basis we define the concept. With regard to conceptual analysis, a well-known paradox known as "the paradox of analysis" is proposed holding that a true conceptual analysis cannot be informative in the sense that it cannot enhances our previous knowledge about the concept. If true, our widespread focus on conceptual analysis on philosophical argument is implausible. In order to cash out the meaning of the paradox, we will first elucidate Moore's (1903) open question argument, we will argue that the argument entails the paradox of analysis. We will then argue that the paradox's claim is implausible, that is, true conceptual analysis can be informative. We will then consider, on the basis of our argument against the paradox of analysis, Church's (1956) account of intensional identities. Our argument, apart from showing the informativity of conceptual analysis, undermines any philosophical positions, like Moore's open question argument, presupposing the paradox of analysis."Conceptual analysis" is one of important analytic philosophers' tools in philosophical argumentations. In the process of analysis, we specify the elements or constituents of a concept on which basis we define the concept. With regard to conceptual analysis, a well-known paradox known as "the paradox of analysis" is proposed holding that a true conceptual analysis cannot be informative in the sense that it cannot enhances our previous knowledge about the concept. If true, our widespread focus on conceptual analysis on philosophical argument is implausible. In order to cash out the meaning of the paradox, we will first elucidate Moore's (1903) open question argument, we will argue that the argument entails the paradox of analysis. We will then argue that the paradox's claim is implausible, that is, true conceptual analysis can be informative. We will then consider, on the basis of our argument against the paradox of analysis, Church's (1956) account of intensional identities. Our argument, apart from showing the informativity of conceptual analysis, undermines any philosophical positions, like Moore's open question argument, presupposing the paradox of analysis.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_22834_5ef6989bc41441359517aa398b9f0616.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923Revolution in Language:Theory of Meaning Based on Kristeva’s AttitudeRevolution in Language:Theory of Meaning Based on Kristeva’s Attitude17322283510.22108/mph.2018.109637.1091FAHassanFatzadeAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Zanjan, IranMarziehDarabiMA, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Azad University North Tehran Branch, IranShamsolmoloukMostafaviAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Islamic Azad University North Tehran Branch, IranJournal Article20180213The significance theory posited by Kristeva may be assumed as influenced by two paradigms of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. In fact, Kristeva shows an evolutionary return to phenomenology and psychiatry by expressing function of significance or in other words exposure to signifying process, the semiotic and the symbolic. She referred to phenomenology to deepen interpretation of concept and description and interpretation of “the symbolic” and inherited “the semiotic” from Freudian psychoanalysis. Impressed by Husserl phenomenology, Kristeva relates phenomenology to psychoanalysis and tries thereby to propose a theory for signifying process. Confronting the phenomenological and psychoanalytical theories with each other prepares platform for Kristeva to develop her theory of meaning and subjectivity. In the age of dominance of the symbolic, she tries to set the possibility of refractoriness and reproducing of meaning to an arbitrary and continual process. By exploiting this dynamic concept, she is going to produce a different representation in language, a revolution in language and cultural structures. The present essay tends to examine effect of factors such as Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and phenomenology in developing theory of meaning, after a review on the intervening elements in signifying process in Kristeva’s thought. In fact, Kristeva’s project is the other side of Derridean deconstructing of metaphysical language.The significance theory posited by Kristeva may be assumed as influenced by two paradigms of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. In fact, Kristeva shows an evolutionary return to phenomenology and psychiatry by expressing function of significance or in other words exposure to signifying process, the semiotic and the symbolic. She referred to phenomenology to deepen interpretation of concept and description and interpretation of “the symbolic” and inherited “the semiotic” from Freudian psychoanalysis. Impressed by Husserl phenomenology, Kristeva relates phenomenology to psychoanalysis and tries thereby to propose a theory for signifying process. Confronting the phenomenological and psychoanalytical theories with each other prepares platform for Kristeva to develop her theory of meaning and subjectivity. In the age of dominance of the symbolic, she tries to set the possibility of refractoriness and reproducing of meaning to an arbitrary and continual process. By exploiting this dynamic concept, she is going to produce a different representation in language, a revolution in language and cultural structures. The present essay tends to examine effect of factors such as Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis and phenomenology in developing theory of meaning, after a review on the intervening elements in signifying process in Kristeva’s thought. In fact, Kristeva’s project is the other side of Derridean deconstructing of metaphysical language.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_22835_85d710cf248e42dbdffea1d8773b6fea.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923Three levels of the Socrates's Irony in the Platonic dialoguesThree levels of the Socrates's Irony in the Platonic dialogues33502298610.22108/mph.2018.93016.0FAGholamRezaEsfahaniResearcher of Philosophy and Literature, graduated in Ph. D of Persian Language and Literature, college of Literature and Humanities, Αzad University branch of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran. Journal Article20160901There is no doubt that understanding Plato’s dialogues in a philosophical way is depended to understanding that what the position of Socrates is? And first of all, because we know that Socrates is the Master of Irony we should consider and try to understand how his Irony works? But the question then arises about the nature of Socratic irony. This has been considered by many scholars who discussed about Socrates. This article aims at the first to give a review on the history of Irony from ancient Greek texts until the Modern’s, and then according to that review explain the necessity of returning to understanding the nature of Socratic irony. After that with recognizing levels of Socrates’ irony in the Platonic dialogues, we’re going to achieve the purpose of the article. The levels of Socrates’ irony that discussed in our classification are: 1. Rhetorical 2. Existential 3. Ontological.There is no doubt that understanding Plato’s dialogues in a philosophical way is depended to understanding that what the position of Socrates is? And first of all, because we know that Socrates is the Master of Irony we should consider and try to understand how his Irony works? But the question then arises about the nature of Socratic irony. This has been considered by many scholars who discussed about Socrates. This article aims at the first to give a review on the history of Irony from ancient Greek texts until the Modern’s, and then according to that review explain the necessity of returning to understanding the nature of Socratic irony. After that with recognizing levels of Socrates’ irony in the Platonic dialogues, we’re going to achieve the purpose of the article. The levels of Socrates’ irony that discussed in our classification are: 1. Rhetorical 2. Existential 3. Ontological.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_22986_a9f77c728785ce78fe4b7cee9307dda8.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923The relation of human being and God in the triple epistemeThe relation of human being and God in the triple episteme51702314410.22108/mph.2018.92978.0FAAliKarbasizadeAssociate Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of literature and human sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranFatemeSakiMA of Philosophy, Faculty of literature and human sciences, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20160320In this paper we try to study the relation of God and human being in the triple episteme of the book The order of Things. The main issue of Foucault in the book is how to form human being as the <em>subject</em> of science in the history of evolution episteme (from Renaissance to Modern) centered on the relation between words and things. On one hand, based on Episteme and dominant thought in each era, the possibility is provided to recognize that based on which order science and knowledge are formed and on the other hand, human being's different interpretations and his stand in each era of history of ideas are appeared. In the present paper, we are trying to contemplate the relation and relevance which human being establishes in this area with God as well as how to genesis the human concept as the subject of science. Additionally, since Episteme and epistemic space of each era is always making over and changing, the relation of human being and God can't also have a stable quality and remain in a single status. We make effort, therefore, to study the backgrounds that although slight, polish our understanding about the world around us and our relations to the nature, words and eventually our relations to God differently.In this paper we try to study the relation of God and human being in the triple episteme of the book The order of Things. The main issue of Foucault in the book is how to form human being as the <em>subject</em> of science in the history of evolution episteme (from Renaissance to Modern) centered on the relation between words and things. On one hand, based on Episteme and dominant thought in each era, the possibility is provided to recognize that based on which order science and knowledge are formed and on the other hand, human being's different interpretations and his stand in each era of history of ideas are appeared. In the present paper, we are trying to contemplate the relation and relevance which human being establishes in this area with God as well as how to genesis the human concept as the subject of science. Additionally, since Episteme and epistemic space of each era is always making over and changing, the relation of human being and God can't also have a stable quality and remain in a single status. We make effort, therefore, to study the backgrounds that although slight, polish our understanding about the world around us and our relations to the nature, words and eventually our relations to God differently.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_23144_2d41c4f46317582880333cce6b78b1dd.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923Critical review of rational reasons for Fayyad Lahiji on proving the existence of intellects.Critical review of rational reasons for Fayyad Lahiji on proving the existence of intellects.71882314510.22108/mph.2018.107144.1059FASeyyed RezaMoazzenDepartment of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, university of Esfahan, Esfahan IranMohamadmahdiMeshkatiAssistant Professor Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Esfahan, Esfahan, IranJournal Article20180103The existence of single beings in the name of intellects is one of the important issues of Islamic philosophy which is favorable and opposed. This article examines the rationale of Fayyad Lahiji on the existence of intellect. He cited three major rational reasons for this issue. His first reason is the rule of Al_ Wahid that he regards it with problems as Khaje Tusi and passes through it. But his two other reasons are based on the permanent motion of the sky and not cause being of the object. Khaje also considers these two reasons unfinished, but Lahiji does not accept the critiques of Khaje on these two reasons and considers these two reasons enough to prove the intellects. This article reinforces Khaje's view and challenges Fayyad's view and also does not consider these two reasons enough to prove the claimThe existence of single beings in the name of intellects is one of the important issues of Islamic philosophy which is favorable and opposed. This article examines the rationale of Fayyad Lahiji on the existence of intellect. He cited three major rational reasons for this issue. His first reason is the rule of Al_ Wahid that he regards it with problems as Khaje Tusi and passes through it. But his two other reasons are based on the permanent motion of the sky and not cause being of the object. Khaje also considers these two reasons unfinished, but Lahiji does not accept the critiques of Khaje on these two reasons and considers these two reasons enough to prove the intellects. This article reinforces Khaje's view and challenges Fayyad's view and also does not consider these two reasons enough to prove the claimhttps://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_23145_babb449a86d80c21423e00c7d3a7cf6b.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276102620180923Conceptual and judgmental foundations of a widespread controversy on validity of conditional syllogismConceptual and judgmental foundations of a widespread controversy on validity of conditional syllogism891072314610.22108/mph.2018.109496.1087FAAsadollahFallahyAssociate professor of Logic Department,
Iranian Institute of Philosophy,
Tehran,
IranJournal Article20180212In his logical book, al-Qiyas al-Shifa, Avicenna proposed his theory on conditional syllogism and then posed a doubt on the validity of conditional Barbara by a seemingly counter-example with minor premise which has an impossible antecedent. He and his followers proposed at least five different answers: 1. falsity of the minor of the counter-example, 2. falsity of the major, 3. truth of the conclusion, 4. failure of repetition of middle term, and 5. invalidity of conditional Barbara. In this paper, we show that these five reactions are rooted in ambiguities in the meaning of “cogent conditional;” and to withdraw the ambiguities, it is needed to answer important questions. By the aid of these answers, we can achieve Sinavi logicians’ conceptual and judgmental foundations for conditional syllogismIn his logical book, al-Qiyas al-Shifa, Avicenna proposed his theory on conditional syllogism and then posed a doubt on the validity of conditional Barbara by a seemingly counter-example with minor premise which has an impossible antecedent. He and his followers proposed at least five different answers: 1. falsity of the minor of the counter-example, 2. falsity of the major, 3. truth of the conclusion, 4. failure of repetition of middle term, and 5. invalidity of conditional Barbara. In this paper, we show that these five reactions are rooted in ambiguities in the meaning of “cogent conditional;” and to withdraw the ambiguities, it is needed to answer important questions. By the aid of these answers, we can achieve Sinavi logicians’ conceptual and judgmental foundations for conditional syllogismhttps://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_23146_a8ce13074d28e723290c3a4c8017a0dd.pdf