University of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321A Look at Tragedy and Tragic Pleasure in the Thought of Susan FeaginA Look at Tragedy and Tragic Pleasure in the Thought of Susan Feagin1132946510.22108/mph.2025.144251.1620FAZeinabAsgary ForoushaniDepartment of Philosophy of Art, Faculty of Advanced Arts Research and Entrepreneurship, Art University of Isfahan, IranMarziehPiravi VanakDepartment of Philosophy of Art, Faculty of Advanced Arts Research and Entrepreneurship, Art University of Isfahan, IranJournal Article20250203Tragedies, despite their painful and fateful content, have always questioned how they can be pleasurable for the audience. Susan Feagin, as a contemporary analytic philosopher, seeks to explain this paradoxical feature. The lack of attention to her works among Persian-speaking audiences further highlights the significance of this research. This study, employing an analytical approach and qualitative methodology, examines the impact of tragedy on the audience and how it evokes a sense of pleasure from Feagin’s perspective. The primary and secondary research questions are as follows: How does tragedy affect the audience? And how does tragedy evoke a sense of pleasure in the audience? Feagin argues that contemporary tragedies, like classical ones, are powerful in their impact but are more often inspired by social realities and historical events such as wars. The findings indicate that emotions such as empathy and meta-response play a crucial role in Feagin’s thought. Tragedy, by creating moments of revelation and transformation in characters, deeply influences the audience psychologically and morally, leading them toward empathy and a deeper understanding of human conditions. Moreover, the pleasure derived from tragedy stems from recognizing shared emotions with others and gaining insight into its ethical dimensions.
<strong> </strong>Tragedies, despite their painful and fateful content, have always questioned how they can be pleasurable for the audience. Susan Feagin, as a contemporary analytic philosopher, seeks to explain this paradoxical feature. The lack of attention to her works among Persian-speaking audiences further highlights the significance of this research. This study, employing an analytical approach and qualitative methodology, examines the impact of tragedy on the audience and how it evokes a sense of pleasure from Feagin’s perspective. The primary and secondary research questions are as follows: How does tragedy affect the audience? And how does tragedy evoke a sense of pleasure in the audience? Feagin argues that contemporary tragedies, like classical ones, are powerful in their impact but are more often inspired by social realities and historical events such as wars. The findings indicate that emotions such as empathy and meta-response play a crucial role in Feagin’s thought. Tragedy, by creating moments of revelation and transformation in characters, deeply influences the audience psychologically and morally, leading them toward empathy and a deeper understanding of human conditions. Moreover, the pleasure derived from tragedy stems from recognizing shared emotions with others and gaining insight into its ethical dimensions.
<strong> </strong>https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29465_26e252baf0e66e84b4cfe8aae5a4dd4b.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321Re-reading Aristotle’s Account of Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines by Contemporary InterpretersRe-reading Aristotle’s Account of Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines by Contemporary Interpreters15262966110.22108/mph.2025.144385.1624FAHosseinKalbasi AshtariProfessor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranErfanAramesh DelM.A. in Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran0009-0003-5217-9006Journal Article20250221In various works, Aristotle critically attributes theories to Plato that have no direct reference in Plato's written dialogues. One notable claim presents Plato identifying Ideas with numbers, asserting the principles of Ideas and numbers as the same, namely, the One and the Indefinite Dyad. In the twentieth century, this issue became a controversial subject among prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, spanning both analytic and continental traditions, commonly referred to as the puzzle of Plato's Unwritten Doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα). The term 'unwritten' suggests that Plato conveys part of his philosophy orally within the Academy, while deliberately avoiding its written documentation. In the English-speaking world, Harold Cherniss adopts an extreme stance, considering Aristotle entirely mistaken and unreliable in his exposition of Plato's thought, thereby rejecting the historical validity of the Unwritten Doctrines. Conversely, scholars like David Ross and John Findlay defend Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's philosophy and the unwritten theory. Meanwhile, in European philosophy, the Tübingen School diverges from the Schleiermacher tradition, arguing that the Unwritten Doctrines represent Plato's most authentic philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer, however, advocates a more balanced perspective regarding Plato's oral versus written teachings. This article evaluates and compares the views of contemporary interpreters.In various works, Aristotle critically attributes theories to Plato that have no direct reference in Plato's written dialogues. One notable claim presents Plato identifying Ideas with numbers, asserting the principles of Ideas and numbers as the same, namely, the One and the Indefinite Dyad. In the twentieth century, this issue became a controversial subject among prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, spanning both analytic and continental traditions, commonly referred to as the puzzle of Plato's Unwritten Doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα). The term 'unwritten' suggests that Plato conveys part of his philosophy orally within the Academy, while deliberately avoiding its written documentation. In the English-speaking world, Harold Cherniss adopts an extreme stance, considering Aristotle entirely mistaken and unreliable in his exposition of Plato's thought, thereby rejecting the historical validity of the Unwritten Doctrines. Conversely, scholars like David Ross and John Findlay defend Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's philosophy and the unwritten theory. Meanwhile, in European philosophy, the Tübingen School diverges from the Schleiermacher tradition, arguing that the Unwritten Doctrines represent Plato's most authentic philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer, however, advocates a more balanced perspective regarding Plato's oral versus written teachings. This article evaluates and compares the views of contemporary interpreters.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29661_66ab863e5608349c1896330bc55738d8.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321The ‘New Induction’ Against Scientific Realism and its Parallel in Philosophy: An Evaluation of Mizrahi’s Response to Stanford’s Pessimistic InductionThe ‘New Induction’ Against Scientific Realism and its Parallel in Philosophy: An Evaluation of Mizrahi’s Response to Stanford’s Pessimistic Induction27452938010.22108/mph.2025.144373.1625FAJavadAkbari TakhtameshlouAssistant Professor in Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, IranSiavashMazdapourPhD Candidate in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250222According to Kyle Stanford’s argument against scientific realism, “New Induction”, past scientists were unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories; therefore, present scientists are also unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories. Consequently, present scientific theories, chosen without considering the alternatives, are not believable. In response to Stanford, Moti Mizrahi argues that since this approach can be extended to philosophers and philosophical theories as well, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. This is because, parallel to the problem of unconceived alternatives, there exists a similar problem in philosophy, called “unconceived objections”: past philosophers were unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories; therefore, present philosophers are also unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories. Consequently, present philosophical theories, chosen without considering the objections, are not believable. Hence, Stanford’s argument, being a philosophical view, is not believable either. <br /><br />In this article, after explaining Mizrahi’s strategy, we will examine and evaluate the coherence and effectiveness of such a strategy. Our objective is to determine whether Mizrahi’s response can truly withstand potential criticisms and plausibly counter Stanford’s argument against scientific realism. The arguments and findings of this study indicate a positive answer to this question.According to Kyle Stanford’s argument against scientific realism, “New Induction”, past scientists were unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories; therefore, present scientists are also unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories. Consequently, present scientific theories, chosen without considering the alternatives, are not believable. In response to Stanford, Moti Mizrahi argues that since this approach can be extended to philosophers and philosophical theories as well, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. This is because, parallel to the problem of unconceived alternatives, there exists a similar problem in philosophy, called “unconceived objections”: past philosophers were unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories; therefore, present philosophers are also unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories. Consequently, present philosophical theories, chosen without considering the objections, are not believable. Hence, Stanford’s argument, being a philosophical view, is not believable either. <br /><br />In this article, after explaining Mizrahi’s strategy, we will examine and evaluate the coherence and effectiveness of such a strategy. Our objective is to determine whether Mizrahi’s response can truly withstand potential criticisms and plausibly counter Stanford’s argument against scientific realism. The arguments and findings of this study indicate a positive answer to this question.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29380_8ff9e8fcac63b3813e3a5adbfca99e0b.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321A Critical Study of the Relation of the Substantial Movement with the Constant and the ChangingA Critical Study of the Relation of the Substantial Movement with the Constant and the Changing47662994910.22108/mph.2025.144570.1630FAMahdiAssadiAssociate Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Contemporary Wisdom, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, IranJournal Article20250304<strong>Abstract </strong>
Some scholars argue that Mullā Ṣadrā places more emphasis on proving substantial movement (<em>al-ḥarakat al-juharīyyah</em>) through the relationship between the constant and the changing than any other proof. They contend that if the moving substance is not interconnected with both the constant and the changing, then nothing else can establish such a connection. Therefore, substantial movement exists. The growing block version of Four-Dimensionalism and static Eternalism are sometimes presented to support this view as well. This paper evaluates and criticizes these claims comprehensively. We will employ a historical methodology to compile criticisms that have arisen throughout history and analyze them using philosophical reasoning and logical tools. We will also propose our own criticisms. The conclusion of our study indicates that none of the aforementioned claims are ultimately acceptable. For instance, if the above-mentioned argument for substantial movement is upheld, it leads to the reemergence of the constant and changing problem in a new context—particularly concerning accidental movement, which can be linked to both the constant and the changing - and the current defenses of the proponents finally cannot be acceptable as well. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the positions of Muṭahharī's growing block theory and Jawādī Āmulī’s Eternalism are contradictory to their own statements, as they have at times explicitly denied the existence of any constant entity within the moving material universe and any coexistence among temporal parts.<strong>Abstract </strong>
Some scholars argue that Mullā Ṣadrā places more emphasis on proving substantial movement (<em>al-ḥarakat al-juharīyyah</em>) through the relationship between the constant and the changing than any other proof. They contend that if the moving substance is not interconnected with both the constant and the changing, then nothing else can establish such a connection. Therefore, substantial movement exists. The growing block version of Four-Dimensionalism and static Eternalism are sometimes presented to support this view as well. This paper evaluates and criticizes these claims comprehensively. We will employ a historical methodology to compile criticisms that have arisen throughout history and analyze them using philosophical reasoning and logical tools. We will also propose our own criticisms. The conclusion of our study indicates that none of the aforementioned claims are ultimately acceptable. For instance, if the above-mentioned argument for substantial movement is upheld, it leads to the reemergence of the constant and changing problem in a new context—particularly concerning accidental movement, which can be linked to both the constant and the changing - and the current defenses of the proponents finally cannot be acceptable as well. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the positions of Muṭahharī's growing block theory and Jawādī Āmulī’s Eternalism are contradictory to their own statements, as they have at times explicitly denied the existence of any constant entity within the moving material universe and any coexistence among temporal parts.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29949_e04a34bd97ae73f8181a8de8ea814fad.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321Conceptual Engineering and the Linguistic Turn: Toward Formulating a Conceptual Meta-PhilosophyConceptual Engineering and the Linguistic Turn: Toward Formulating a Conceptual Meta-Philosophy67832972710.22108/mph.2025.144909.1633FAMortezaNouriAssistant professor in department of philosophy, faculty of letters and human sciences, Shahid Beheshti university,Thran, IranJournal Article20250418This paper aims to demonstrate that a metaphilosophical approach grounded in conceptual engineering offers a more comprehensive and effective framework for analyzing and resolving philosophical problems than one based on linguistic philosophy. Whereas ordinary language philosophers emphasized the preservation of natural language and its constraints, and ideal language philosophers sought to avoid reliance on conceptual entities altogether, conceptual engineering endeavors to move beyond such limitations by drawing on the flexibility of concepts and the possibility of reconstructing conceptual frameworks. Instead of being bound by inherited linguistic structures, conceptual engineering focuses on revising or replacing our cognitive tools concerning epistemic, ethical, and social goals. The principal aim of this article is to examine the transition from the linguistic turn to the conceptual turn and to reassess the philosophical insights of Wittgenstein and Quine in this context - either as critical challenges or as sources of support for this transition. Although both philosophers maintain views that are, in various ways, restrictive toward concepts, their reflections on use, behavior, and conceptual change can be repurposed to advance the project of conceptual engineering. Thus, this paper outlines an alternative metaphilosophical vision - one that builds upon the legacy of linguistic philosophy while opening up new prospects for philosophy’s active role in reshaping conceptual schemes and, thereby, transforming the ways we think about the world.This paper aims to demonstrate that a metaphilosophical approach grounded in conceptual engineering offers a more comprehensive and effective framework for analyzing and resolving philosophical problems than one based on linguistic philosophy. Whereas ordinary language philosophers emphasized the preservation of natural language and its constraints, and ideal language philosophers sought to avoid reliance on conceptual entities altogether, conceptual engineering endeavors to move beyond such limitations by drawing on the flexibility of concepts and the possibility of reconstructing conceptual frameworks. Instead of being bound by inherited linguistic structures, conceptual engineering focuses on revising or replacing our cognitive tools concerning epistemic, ethical, and social goals. The principal aim of this article is to examine the transition from the linguistic turn to the conceptual turn and to reassess the philosophical insights of Wittgenstein and Quine in this context - either as critical challenges or as sources of support for this transition. Although both philosophers maintain views that are, in various ways, restrictive toward concepts, their reflections on use, behavior, and conceptual change can be repurposed to advance the project of conceptual engineering. Thus, this paper outlines an alternative metaphilosophical vision - one that builds upon the legacy of linguistic philosophy while opening up new prospects for philosophy’s active role in reshaping conceptual schemes and, thereby, transforming the ways we think about the world.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29727_5e51efffe25f446993132043a95372c8.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321Phenomenological Explanation of the Transfiguration of the Being of Everyday Objects in Modern Art based on Heidegger's ThoughtsPhenomenological Explanation of the Transfiguration of the Being of Everyday Objects in Modern Art based on Heidegger's Thoughts851012991210.22108/mph.2025.144910.1634FAPouryaShokouhimaneshDepartment of Art Research, Art University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranNaderShayganfarDepartment of Art Research, Art University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20250412<strong>Abstract</strong>
It appears that with the emergence of everyday objects in certain forms of modern art, we are confronted with a kind of transfiguration of the ordinary object into an artwork. This study aims to elucidate the ontological implications of this transfiguration and demonstrate how modern art transcends and transforms the domain of the natural understanding of beings by turning an everyday object into an artwork. To achieve this goal, a phenomenological approach based on Heidegger’s perspective is adopted, examining the transfiguration of everyday objects into artworks in light of the contrast between natural understanding and phenomenological understanding of beings. Following this path, it seems that the transfiguration of an everyday object into an artwork does not fit within the framework of the natural understanding of beings, as the natural understanding considers beings as things in themselves and devoid of relation. However, what occurs in this transfiguration is precisely the establishment of a new relation and encounter between us and the object, which the artist brings about by throwing the object into a new context and world. Conversely, since phenomenology understands the being of beings solely with regard to the notion of encounter and intentionality, and from the perspective of the way beings appear to us, the emergence of an everyday object as artwork can be explained within this framework. Based on this, it can be concluded that the modern artist, like a phenomenologist, suspends the natural understanding of beings and leads us into the phenomenological sphere of understanding of being.<strong>Abstract</strong>
It appears that with the emergence of everyday objects in certain forms of modern art, we are confronted with a kind of transfiguration of the ordinary object into an artwork. This study aims to elucidate the ontological implications of this transfiguration and demonstrate how modern art transcends and transforms the domain of the natural understanding of beings by turning an everyday object into an artwork. To achieve this goal, a phenomenological approach based on Heidegger’s perspective is adopted, examining the transfiguration of everyday objects into artworks in light of the contrast between natural understanding and phenomenological understanding of beings. Following this path, it seems that the transfiguration of an everyday object into an artwork does not fit within the framework of the natural understanding of beings, as the natural understanding considers beings as things in themselves and devoid of relation. However, what occurs in this transfiguration is precisely the establishment of a new relation and encounter between us and the object, which the artist brings about by throwing the object into a new context and world. Conversely, since phenomenology understands the being of beings solely with regard to the notion of encounter and intentionality, and from the perspective of the way beings appear to us, the emergence of an everyday object as artwork can be explained within this framework. Based on this, it can be concluded that the modern artist, like a phenomenologist, suspends the natural understanding of beings and leads us into the phenomenological sphere of understanding of being.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29912_eb2e73544dce7b163b509febd849b112.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321Rethinking Narrative as Representation of Subjective PossibilitiesRethinking Narrative as Representation of Subjective Possibilities1031193001910.22108/mph.2025.145398.1640FAMasoudAlgooneh JuneghaniAssociate professor of Persian language and literature, Department of Persian language and literature, Faculty of humanities, university of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20250523<strong>Abstract</strong>
This study offers a critical and comparative rereading of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative as a representation of human action within the context of literature. Central to this rereading is the conceptual model of the “fivefold orientation of the subject,” which includes orientation toward the self, the other, the material world, the Big Other, and language. Inspired by the traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and discourse analysis, this model provides a framework for understanding the multilayered, dialectical nature of subjectivity in narrative. The article argues that narrative is not a neutral reflection of action, but an active and subjective mechanism for reconstructing the self—a process in which language, power, structure, history, ideology, memory, the body, and social institutions are all simultaneously at work. From this perspective, the subject in narrative is both the creator of meaning and a product of discourses. The study concludes by briefly examining the theoretical implications of this approach for ideology critique and rethinking the autonomy of the subject.<strong>Abstract</strong>
This study offers a critical and comparative rereading of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative as a representation of human action within the context of literature. Central to this rereading is the conceptual model of the “fivefold orientation of the subject,” which includes orientation toward the self, the other, the material world, the Big Other, and language. Inspired by the traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and discourse analysis, this model provides a framework for understanding the multilayered, dialectical nature of subjectivity in narrative. The article argues that narrative is not a neutral reflection of action, but an active and subjective mechanism for reconstructing the self—a process in which language, power, structure, history, ideology, memory, the body, and social institutions are all simultaneously at work. From this perspective, the subject in narrative is both the creator of meaning and a product of discourses. The study concludes by briefly examining the theoretical implications of this approach for ideology critique and rethinking the autonomy of the subject.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30019_57712b4b72d41b0fa02e8310597f2e69.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321Study and Critique of Lynch’s Pluralist and Functionalist Theory of TruthStudy and Critique of Lynch’s Pluralist and Functionalist Theory of Truth1211352997110.22108/mph.2025.145473.1642FAHoomanMohammad GhorbanianAssistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran0000-0001-6601-063XSaraGhaneDepartment of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom, Qom, IranJournal Article20250530Michael Lynch, by proposing a functionalist theory of truth, offers an engaging framework for moderate alethic pluralism. Unlike strong pluralism, which views truth as a collection of independent and disparate properties, Lynch argues that truth is a functional property defined through shared normative truisms such as "truth is the aim of belief," "truth is distinct from justification," and "truth is worth pursuing in inquiry." In his view, truth must account for objectivity, normativity, and the goal of research. Lynch’s theory requires further development in explaining how local truth-constituting properties, such as correspondence in science or coherence in ethics, relate to the overall functional role of truth, maintaining distance from reductive theories of truth, clarifying the meaning of truth in mixed discourses, and avoiding metaphysical complexities. By assuming a specific characterization of truth, such as correspondence, reducing metaphysical principles, and redefining the normative role of truth, one can arrive at a pluralist view of truth that both preserves the conceptual unity of truth and interprets its meaning differently across various scientific domains. This study aims to provide a coherent framework for understanding truth pluralism that both respects discursive diversity and responds to criticisms of Lynch's theory.Michael Lynch, by proposing a functionalist theory of truth, offers an engaging framework for moderate alethic pluralism. Unlike strong pluralism, which views truth as a collection of independent and disparate properties, Lynch argues that truth is a functional property defined through shared normative truisms such as "truth is the aim of belief," "truth is distinct from justification," and "truth is worth pursuing in inquiry." In his view, truth must account for objectivity, normativity, and the goal of research. Lynch’s theory requires further development in explaining how local truth-constituting properties, such as correspondence in science or coherence in ethics, relate to the overall functional role of truth, maintaining distance from reductive theories of truth, clarifying the meaning of truth in mixed discourses, and avoiding metaphysical complexities. By assuming a specific characterization of truth, such as correspondence, reducing metaphysical principles, and redefining the normative role of truth, one can arrive at a pluralist view of truth that both preserves the conceptual unity of truth and interprets its meaning differently across various scientific domains. This study aims to provide a coherent framework for understanding truth pluralism that both respects discursive diversity and responds to criticisms of Lynch's theory.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29971_31e1ead1f4c8e294c174acdf4ba83483.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321How Does Engagement with Artistic Beauty in Kant’s Philosophy Lead to Moral Action in IndividualsHow Does Engagement with Artistic Beauty in Kant’s Philosophy Lead to Moral Action in Individuals1371453006510.22108/mph.2025.145640.1647FAMiladOlfatDepartment of Art Education, Farhangian University, P.O. Box 14665-889, Tehran, Iran.0000-0002-6772-3276Rezvaneh SadatHoseiniMA in Philosophy of Art, Department of Philosophy of Art, Faculty of Art and Architecture, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran.0000-0002-1059-4637Journal Article20250613<strong>Abstract</strong>
This paper examines the relationship between aesthetics and morality in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, asking whether the experience of beauty—particularly in art—can lead to moral action. In the <em>Critique of Judgment</em> (1790), Kant conceives the realm of beauty as autonomous from the sphere of morality, emphasizing that judgments of taste must be “disinterested,” free from desire, utility, or moral obligation. Nevertheless, he establishes an indirect connection between aesthetic experience and moral capacity, a relation explicable through the concept of “purposiveness without purpose.” The central question of the paper is how this independence and, at the same time, this correlation can be understood within Kant’s system of thought. Through an examination of the distinction between “free beauty” and “dependent beauty,” and by engaging interpretations such as Wenzel’s (2005), the study argues that artistic beauty—especially in its dependent form—can serve as a symbol of the moral law and prepare the mind for the reception of moral ideas. However, from Kant’s perspective, while aesthetic experience may facilitate moral motivation, it is not a sufficient condition for moral action, since morality is grounded in the autonomy of the will and the conscious commitment to the rational law. The paper concludes that artistic beauty in Kant’s philosophy functions as a mediating symbol: not a direct cause of moral action, but a domain that nurtures moral sensitivity and cognitive readiness toward ethical understanding.<strong>Abstract</strong>
This paper examines the relationship between aesthetics and morality in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, asking whether the experience of beauty—particularly in art—can lead to moral action. In the <em>Critique of Judgment</em> (1790), Kant conceives the realm of beauty as autonomous from the sphere of morality, emphasizing that judgments of taste must be “disinterested,” free from desire, utility, or moral obligation. Nevertheless, he establishes an indirect connection between aesthetic experience and moral capacity, a relation explicable through the concept of “purposiveness without purpose.” The central question of the paper is how this independence and, at the same time, this correlation can be understood within Kant’s system of thought. Through an examination of the distinction between “free beauty” and “dependent beauty,” and by engaging interpretations such as Wenzel’s (2005), the study argues that artistic beauty—especially in its dependent form—can serve as a symbol of the moral law and prepare the mind for the reception of moral ideas. However, from Kant’s perspective, while aesthetic experience may facilitate moral motivation, it is not a sufficient condition for moral action, since morality is grounded in the autonomy of the will and the conscious commitment to the rational law. The paper concludes that artistic beauty in Kant’s philosophy functions as a mediating symbol: not a direct cause of moral action, but a domain that nurtures moral sensitivity and cognitive readiness toward ethical understanding.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30065_93db0af623a3371d5ca0e5b5521a7dde.pdfUniversity of IsfahanMetaphysics2476-3276184120260321The Artifact-Like Nature of Scientific ModelsThe Artifact-Like Nature of Scientific Models1471622994810.22108/mph.2025.145811.1652FAAliSeyedi DehaghaniInstitute for Humanities and Cultural StudiesAlirezaMansouriInstitute for Humanities and Cultural StudiesJournal Article20250702The present article critiques prevalent views regarding the nature of abstract scientific models, arguing that these approaches fail to account for the role of intentionality in determining a model's essence. Instead, the paper proposes that scientific models should be viewed as abstract artifacts whose nature is directly dependent on the design intention, specific scientific goals, and the particular institutional contexts in which they are embedded. This approach specifically emphasizes the importance of intentionality in the formation of scientific models, positing that these models are purposefully designed to achieve specific scientific and research objectives. This perspective carries significant metaphysical implications, as it leverages the philosophy of artifacts to stress the existential dependence of models on the collective intention of scientists and the role of scientific institutions in shaping and establishing them. Finally, by offering a solution to the ontological problem of models, the article paves the way for proposing a form of institutional-functional realism that assesses the reality of models within the framework of their scientific and social functions.The present article critiques prevalent views regarding the nature of abstract scientific models, arguing that these approaches fail to account for the role of intentionality in determining a model's essence. Instead, the paper proposes that scientific models should be viewed as abstract artifacts whose nature is directly dependent on the design intention, specific scientific goals, and the particular institutional contexts in which they are embedded. This approach specifically emphasizes the importance of intentionality in the formation of scientific models, positing that these models are purposefully designed to achieve specific scientific and research objectives. This perspective carries significant metaphysical implications, as it leverages the philosophy of artifacts to stress the existential dependence of models on the collective intention of scientists and the role of scientific institutions in shaping and establishing them. Finally, by offering a solution to the ontological problem of models, the article paves the way for proposing a form of institutional-functional realism that assesses the reality of models within the framework of their scientific and social functions.https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29948_afb166eb0d483339c556c445f86c38ec.pdf