https://mph.ui.ac.ir/ Metaphysics en daily 1 Sat, 21 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 Sat, 21 Mar 2026 00:00:00 +0330 https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30213.html https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29465.html Tragedies, despite their painful and fateful content, have always questioned how they can be pleasurable for the audience. Susan Feagin, as a contemporary analytic philosopher, seeks to explain this paradoxical feature. The lack of attention to her works among Persian-speaking audiences further highlights the significance of this research. This study, employing an analytical approach and qualitative methodology, examines the impact of tragedy on the audience and how it evokes a sense of pleasure from Feagin’s perspective. The primary and secondary research questions are as follows: How does tragedy affect the audience? And how does tragedy evoke a sense of pleasure in the audience? Feagin argues that contemporary tragedies, like classical ones, are powerful in their impact but are more often inspired by social realities and historical events such as wars. The findings indicate that emotions such as empathy and meta-response play a crucial role in Feagin’s thought. Tragedy, by creating moments of revelation and transformation in characters, deeply influences the audience psychologically and morally, leading them toward empathy and a deeper understanding of human conditions. Moreover, the pleasure derived from tragedy stems from recognizing shared emotions with others and gaining insight into its ethical dimensions.   https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29661.html In various works, Aristotle critically attributes theories to Plato that have no direct reference in Plato's written dialogues. One notable claim presents Plato identifying Ideas with numbers, asserting the principles of Ideas and numbers as the same, namely, the One and the Indefinite Dyad. In the twentieth century, this issue became a controversial subject among prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, spanning both analytic and continental traditions, commonly referred to as the puzzle of Plato's Unwritten Doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα). The term 'unwritten' suggests that Plato conveys part of his philosophy orally within the Academy, while deliberately avoiding its written documentation. In the English-speaking world, Harold Cherniss adopts an extreme stance, considering Aristotle entirely mistaken and unreliable in his exposition of Plato's thought, thereby rejecting the historical validity of the Unwritten Doctrines. Conversely, scholars like David Ross and John Findlay defend Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's philosophy and the unwritten theory. Meanwhile, in European philosophy, the Tübingen School diverges from the Schleiermacher tradition, arguing that the Unwritten Doctrines represent Plato's most authentic philosophy. Hans-Georg Gadamer, however, advocates a more balanced perspective regarding Plato's oral versus written teachings. This article evaluates and compares the views of contemporary interpreters. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29380.html According to Kyle Stanford’s argument against scientific realism, “New Induction”, past scientists were unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories; therefore, present scientists are also unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories. Consequently, present scientific theories, chosen without considering the alternatives, are not believable. In response to Stanford, Moti Mizrahi argues that since this approach can be extended to philosophers and philosophical theories as well, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. This is because, parallel to the problem of unconceived alternatives, there exists a similar problem in philosophy, called “unconceived objections”: past philosophers were unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories; therefore, present philosophers are also unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories. Consequently, present philosophical theories, chosen without considering the objections, are not believable. Hence, Stanford’s argument, being a philosophical view, is not believable either. In this article, after explaining Mizrahi’s strategy, we will examine and evaluate the coherence and effectiveness of such a strategy. Our objective is to determine whether Mizrahi’s response can truly withstand potential criticisms and plausibly counter Stanford’s argument against scientific realism. The arguments and findings of this study indicate a positive answer to this question. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29949.html Abstract Some scholars argue that Mullā Ṣadrā places more emphasis on proving substantial movement (al-ḥarakat al-juharīyyah) through the relationship between the constant and the changing than any other proof. They contend that if the moving substance is not interconnected with both the constant and the changing, then nothing else can establish such a connection. Therefore, substantial movement exists. The growing block version of Four-Dimensionalism and static Eternalism are sometimes presented to support this view as well. This paper evaluates and criticizes these claims comprehensively. We will employ a historical methodology to compile criticisms that have arisen throughout history and analyze them using philosophical reasoning and logical tools. We will also propose our own criticisms. The conclusion of our study indicates that none of the aforementioned claims are ultimately acceptable. For instance, if the above-mentioned argument for substantial movement is upheld, it leads to the reemergence of the constant and changing problem in a new context—particularly concerning accidental movement, which can be linked to both the constant and the changing - and the current defenses of the proponents finally cannot be acceptable as well. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the positions of Muṭahharī's growing block theory and Jawādī Āmulī’s Eternalism are contradictory to their own statements, as they have at times explicitly denied the existence of any constant entity within the moving material universe and any coexistence among temporal parts. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29727.html This paper aims to demonstrate that a metaphilosophical approach grounded in conceptual engineering offers a more comprehensive and effective framework for analyzing and resolving philosophical problems than one based on linguistic philosophy. Whereas ordinary language philosophers emphasized the preservation of natural language and its constraints, and ideal language philosophers sought to avoid reliance on conceptual entities altogether, conceptual engineering endeavors to move beyond such limitations by drawing on the flexibility of concepts and the possibility of reconstructing conceptual frameworks. Instead of being bound by inherited linguistic structures, conceptual engineering focuses on revising or replacing our cognitive tools concerning epistemic, ethical, and social goals. The principal aim of this article is to examine the transition from the linguistic turn to the conceptual turn and to reassess the philosophical insights of Wittgenstein and Quine in this context - either as critical challenges or as sources of support for this transition. Although both philosophers maintain views that are, in various ways, restrictive toward concepts, their reflections on use, behavior, and conceptual change can be repurposed to advance the project of conceptual engineering. Thus, this paper outlines an alternative metaphilosophical vision - one that builds upon the legacy of linguistic philosophy while opening up new prospects for philosophy’s active role in reshaping conceptual schemes and, thereby, transforming the ways we think about the world. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29912.html Abstract It appears that with the emergence of everyday objects in certain forms of modern art, we are confronted with a kind of transfiguration of the ordinary object into an artwork. This study aims to elucidate the ontological implications of this transfiguration and demonstrate how modern art transcends and transforms the domain of the natural understanding of beings by turning an everyday object into an artwork. To achieve this goal, a phenomenological approach based on Heidegger’s perspective is adopted, examining the transfiguration of everyday objects into artworks in light of the contrast between natural understanding and phenomenological understanding of beings. Following this path, it seems that the transfiguration of an everyday object into an artwork does not fit within the framework of the natural understanding of beings, as the natural understanding considers beings as things in themselves and devoid of relation. However, what occurs in this transfiguration is precisely the establishment of a new relation and encounter between us and the object, which the artist brings about by throwing the object into a new context and world. Conversely, since phenomenology understands the being of beings solely with regard to the notion of encounter and intentionality, and from the perspective of the way beings appear to us, the emergence of an everyday object as artwork can be explained within this framework. Based on this, it can be concluded that the modern artist, like a phenomenologist, suspends the natural understanding of beings and leads us into the phenomenological sphere of understanding of being. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30019.html Abstract This study offers a critical and comparative rereading of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative as a representation of human action within the context of literature. Central to this rereading is the conceptual model of the “fivefold orientation of the subject,” which includes orientation toward the self, the other, the material world, the Big Other, and language. Inspired by the traditions of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and discourse analysis, this model provides a framework for understanding the multilayered, dialectical nature of subjectivity in narrative. The article argues that narrative is not a neutral reflection of action, but an active and subjective mechanism for reconstructing the self—a process in which language, power, structure, history, ideology, memory, the body, and social institutions are all simultaneously at work. From this perspective, the subject in narrative is both the creator of meaning and a product of discourses. The study concludes by briefly examining the theoretical implications of this approach for ideology critique and rethinking the autonomy of the subject. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29971.html Michael Lynch, by proposing a functionalist theory of truth, offers an engaging framework for moderate alethic pluralism. Unlike strong pluralism, which views truth as a collection of independent and disparate properties, Lynch argues that truth is a functional property defined through shared normative truisms such as "truth is the aim of belief," "truth is distinct from justification," and "truth is worth pursuing in inquiry." In his view, truth must account for objectivity, normativity, and the goal of research. Lynch’s theory requires further development in explaining how local truth-constituting properties, such as correspondence in science or coherence in ethics, relate to the overall functional role of truth, maintaining distance from reductive theories of truth, clarifying the meaning of truth in mixed discourses, and avoiding metaphysical complexities. By assuming a specific characterization of truth, such as correspondence, reducing metaphysical principles, and redefining the normative role of truth, one can arrive at a pluralist view of truth that both preserves the conceptual unity of truth and interprets its meaning differently across various scientific domains. This study aims to provide a coherent framework for understanding truth pluralism that both respects discursive diversity and responds to criticisms of Lynch's theory. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30065.html Abstract This paper examines the relationship between aesthetics and morality in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, asking whether the experience of beauty—particularly in art—can lead to moral action. In the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant conceives the realm of beauty as autonomous from the sphere of morality, emphasizing that judgments of taste must be “disinterested,” free from desire, utility, or moral obligation. Nevertheless, he establishes an indirect connection between aesthetic experience and moral capacity, a relation explicable through the concept of “purposiveness without purpose.” The central question of the paper is how this independence and, at the same time, this correlation can be understood within Kant’s system of thought. Through an examination of the distinction between “free beauty” and “dependent beauty,” and by engaging interpretations such as Wenzel’s (2005), the study argues that artistic beauty—especially in its dependent form—can serve as a symbol of the moral law and prepare the mind for the reception of moral ideas. However, from Kant’s perspective, while aesthetic experience may facilitate moral motivation, it is not a sufficient condition for moral action, since morality is grounded in the autonomy of the will and the conscious commitment to the rational law. The paper concludes that artistic beauty in Kant’s philosophy functions as a mediating symbol: not a direct cause of moral action, but a domain that nurtures moral sensitivity and cognitive readiness toward ethical understanding. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_29948.html The present article critiques prevalent views regarding the nature of abstract scientific models, arguing that these approaches fail to account for the role of intentionality in determining a model's essence. Instead, the paper proposes that scientific models should be viewed as abstract artifacts whose nature is directly dependent on the design intention, specific scientific goals, and the particular institutional contexts in which they are embedded. This approach specifically emphasizes the importance of intentionality in the formation of scientific models, positing that these models are purposefully designed to achieve specific scientific and research objectives. This perspective carries significant metaphysical implications, as it leverages the philosophy of artifacts to stress the existential dependence of models on the collective intention of scientists and the role of scientific institutions in shaping and establishing them. Finally, by offering a solution to the ontological problem of models, the article paves the way for proposing a form of institutional-functional realism that assesses the reality of models within the framework of their scientific and social functions. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30076.html The Fundamental Differences Between Mathematics and Philosophy from Kant's Perspective Abstract This article examines Kant’s views on the fundamental distinctions between mathematics and philosophy, particularly the ineffectiveness of mathematical methods in philosophical inquiry. Kant contrasts his perspective with Mendelssohn’s, who, within the Wolff-Leibnizian tradition, believed metaphysics could achieve certainty through reason and logical deduction, akin to mathematics. Kant argues that mathematics employs a synthetic method, constructing concepts through pure intuition, whereas philosophy uses an analytical method to examine pre-given concepts. Mathematics achieves certainty by constructing concepts in intuition, but philosophy cannot adopt this approach, as its concepts are derived analytically from existing data. This methodological difference indicates that mathematical certainty cannot be transferred to philosophy. Thus, while mathematics offers a model for certainty in knowledge, its methods are not suitable for philosophy. Philosophy must find its own way to certainty through critical reflection on the conditions of possible experience, as outlined in transcendental philosophy. Keywords: Kant, mathematics, philosophy, intuition, concept construction, mathematical method. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30171.html Hans-Georg Gadamer explains the audience encounter with a work of art within the framework of Dasein's projection into the play of the work. This play has an existential dimension, and the meaning of the audience presence lies in establishing a relationship with the world of the work, the ground which is rooted in historical-cultural projection. The present study aims to elucidate the audience encounter with the artwork in terms of its role in determining the meaning of truth. According to the research findings, from Gadamer's perspective, the opening of the artwork to the audience is realized only through its realization (Vollzug) and the presence of the audience. Thus, the audience—as a thrown-projecting being—is both affected by the play of the work and affects it in return. On the other hand, Mikel Dufrenne argues that the transformation of the artwork into an aesthetic object entirely depends on the audience dwelling within the work and participating in it when the work calls upon them. While much has been said about the concept of play, the precise role of the the engaged participant has been a fundamental concern for both thinkers. This raises the question: How does the event of encountering the artwork lead to the alethea of truth?Dufrenne describes a relationship based on exchange, whereas Gadamer speaks of a dialectical interplay of simultaneous and co-constitutive fusion of horizons. For Dufrenne, presentation and interpretation remain distinct, whereas for Gadamer, they fuse into one another. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30233.html This article explores the possibility of Indemonstrable Faith within the framework of David Hume’s philosophy and seeks to show that the collapse of rationalist theology in his system does not necessarily entail the complete elimination of religion. The central question of the article is whether Hume’s critique of the epistemological and practical foundations of religion renders any form of faith impossible, or whether an alternative model of faith can still be meaningfully articulated. Employing an analytical–critical methodology and engaging with the tradition of British rationalist theology—particularly Samuel Clarke’s demonstrative system—the article argues that although Hume dismantles the four major pillars of Demonstrable Faith and evidentialist natural theology, he simultaneously opens the way for a psychological, nature based, and non-cognitivist understanding of religious faith. According to the thesis developed here, religious faith in Hume’s framework is not a demonstrable or evidentially grounded belief, but rather a natural propensity, an existential response to uncertainty, and a phenomenon rooted in human emotions and the cognitive mechanisms of the mind. The article concludes that Hume’s thought allows for a naturalistic, Indemonstrable model of faith—one that mediates between his radical critique of traditional theology and the enduring human need for meaning, thereby offering a renewed horizon for contemporary philosophy of religion. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30249.html The problem of religious disagreement remains one of the most profound challenges in contemporary epistemology of religion. Nicholas Wolterstorff, a leading figure in analytic philosophy of religion, offers a distinctive response to this problem grounded in the concepts of inexplicable disagreement, epistemic entitlement, and trust in cognition. His approach, which stands in contrast to Lockean evidentialism and contemporary conciliationism, seeks to preserve the rationality of religious belief even in the face of peer disagreement. Wolterstorff argues that many deep and persistent disagreements in philosophy, religion, and ethics are “inexplicable” and cannot be reduced to error or negligence. Thus, mere awareness of such disagreement does not necessarily mandate suspension of belief. If a believer has fulfilled all their “epistemic duties” in forming a belief, they remain entitled to hold it despite peer disagreement. This paper reconstructs and critically evaluates Wolterstorff’s view along four key axes: epistemic, methodological, virtue-theoretic, and socio-normative. It shows that while his theory represents a significant advance in reconceiving rational religious belief in a pluralistic world, it faces serious challenges concerning the role of higher-order evidence, the vagueness of entitlement, the risk of “virtue-cloaked dogmatism,” and the difficulty of bridging personal and public rationality. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for future development and argues that Wolterstorff’s project opens a promising middle path between conciliationist skepticism and traditionalist dogmatism. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30256.html To establish the foundation of political philosophy, Socrates had to define his position in relation to the Sophists, as proponents of the union between politics and wisdom, and to the pre-Socratic philosophers who withdrew from politics. Plato reports this dual encounter with Socrates in several dialogues, among which the Greater Hippias holds a special place because of its theme and explicit examination of this issue. This paper seeks to reinterpret this dialogue through the method of Close Reading, demonstrating how Socrates, by posing the question of the nature of beauty to Hippias and pursuing a dialectical examination of his responses and arguments, advances this dual engagement. This approach goes beyond merely analyzing the logical content of the arguments; it also considers the dramatic details of the dialogue, insofar as they contribute uniquely to the significance of the arguments. Efforts were made to extract implicit reasoning woven into the dialogue, as intended by the author. In doing so, it becomes evident that Socrates, while refuting Sophists' claim to progressive wisdom, does not reject the notion of progressive wisdom altogether. Hence, his dialectical defense of the wisdom of the ancients against the Sophists exceeds mere affirmation, as he introduces fundamental principles—namely, the dialectical ontology of the intelligible and the sensible. At the same time, Socrates demonstrates through these principles that the practical union of wisdom and politics, intrinsically tied to a definitive answer to the question of the nature of beauty, is impossible, contrary to Sophists’ presumption. https://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_30400.html The primary aim of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is to explore the nature of a happy life. Aristotle approaches the definition of happiness twice, each time in two different but interconnected ways. In the first book, he defines happiness as a life in accordance with human virtue—a virtue stemming from the core function of humans, which is reason. However, by adding the qualification “an aspect that falls under reason,” he includes civic virtues as part of the essential functions of human existence. Additionally, he introduces external conditions, such as good fortune, virtuous friends, and wealth, as prerequisites for achieving happiness. The virtues required for this kind of happiness are those realized within the city and are dependent on the city’s accepted nomoi (laws), thus binding them to political matters. Consequently, it appears that the definition of happiness and the articulation of virtues in the first nine books of Ethics are meaningful within a political context. However, in Book X, Aristotle shifts his tone, defining happiness as a life in accordance with reason, specifically contemplation. This life is no longer bound by action, political virtues, or external conditions. This shift has led some modern interpreters of Aristotle to view Book X as conflicting with the earlier books and unrelated to them. This article aims to demonstrate that Aristotle’s change in tone serves to reveal the tension between philosophical and political life, while also showing that the philosophical life, despite this tension, retains a hidden connection to political life