The Ethics of Punitivism from the perspective of Shatibi's Maghasid al-Sharia and Bentham's Utilitarianism

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

Department of Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran

10.22108/mph.2024.141106.1556

Abstract

Punishment, its justification, and the relationship between punishment and justice are important topics in both moral philosophy and jurisprudence (Figh). In this article, which is devoted to the topic of retributivism, first the definition of retributivism and its purpose are stated, and then the theories of Shatibi and Jeremy Bentham regarding punishment are presented. After a comparative discussion, the objections that arise against the utilitarian school regarding punishment are mentioned. Through Shatibi's retributive theory, which operates based on rules, objections are raised against Bentham's retributive theory, which proceeds based on act-utilitarianism, including the issue of justice being called into question in punishment. Additionally, three major differences between Shatibi's purposes of Sharia and Bentham's utilitarian retributivism are discussed, which in a way demonstrate the strength and superiority of the purposes of Sharia over utilitarianism. The first difference is the temporal criteria for benefit. The second difference is the confinement of pleasure to material pleasures in utilitarianism, while the purposes of Sharia consider both material and spiritual pleasures. The third difference is that in utilitarianism, the consideration of religion is subordinate to worldly matters, whereas in the purposes of Sharia, the consideration of religion takes precedence over worldly matters, such that religion is the basis and foundation for other benefits. In Bentham's utilitarianism, punishment itself is considered a suffering, unless its benefit outweighs its harm. In cases where it leads to the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people, punishment is desirable, even if it results in injustice.

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 01 October 2024
  • Receive Date: 24 April 2024
  • Revise Date: 17 August 2024
  • Accept Date: 01 September 2024