Conceptual Engineering and the Linguistic Turn: Toward Formulating a Conceptual Meta-Philosophy

This paper aims to demonstrate that a metaphilosophical approach grounded in conceptual engineering offers a more comprehensive and effective framework for analyzing and resolving philosophical problems than one based on linguistic philosophy. Whereas ordinary language philosophers emphasized the preservation of natural language and its constraints, and ideal language philosophers sought to avoid reliance on conceptual entities altogether, conceptual engineering endeavors to move beyond such limitations by drawing on the flexibility of concepts and the possibility of reconstructing conceptual frameworks. Instead of being bound by inherited linguistic structures, conceptual engineering focuses on revising or replacing our cognitive tools in accordance with epistemic, ethical, and social goals. The principal aim of this article is to examine the transition from the linguistic turn to the conceptual turn and to reassess the philosophical insights of Wittgenstein and Quine in this context - either as critical challenges or as sources of support for this transition. Although both philosophers maintain views that are, in various ways, restrictive toward concepts, their reflections on use, behavior, and conceptual change can be repurposed to advance the project of conceptual engineering. Thus, this paper outlines an alternative metaphilosophical vision - one that builds upon the legacy of linguistic philosophy while opening up new prospects for philosophy’s active role in reshaping conceptual schemes and, thereby, transforming the ways we think about the world.