Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
2
Department of Ethics, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Qom,Qom,Iran
10.22108/mph.2025.145473.1642
Abstract
Michael Lynch, by proposing a functionalist theory of truth, offers an engaging framework for moderate alethic pluralism. Unlike strong pluralism, which views truth as a collection of independent and disparate properties, Lynch argues that truth is a functional property defined through shared normative truisms such as "truth is the aim of belief," "truth is distinct from justification," and "truth is worth pursuing in inquiry." In his view, truth must account for objectivity, normativity, and the goal of research. Lynch’s theory requires further development in explaining how local truth-constituting properties, such as correspondence in science or coherence in ethics, relate to the overall functional role of truth, maintaining distance from reductive theories of truth, clarifying the meaning of truth in mixed discourses, and avoiding metaphysical complexities. By assuming a specific characterization of truth, such as correspondence, reducing metaphysical principles, and redefining the normative role of truth, one can arrive at a pluralist view of truth that both preserves the conceptual unity of truth and interprets its meaning differently across various scientific domains. The aim of this study is to provide a coherent framework for understanding truth pluralism that both respects discursive diversity and responds to criticisms of Lynch's theory.
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