The Possibility of Indemonstrable Faith in David Hume’s Thought: From Rationalist Theology to a Nature-Based Conception of Religion

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Postdoctoral Researcher in Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

2 Full Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran.

10.22108/mph.2026.146301.1659

Abstract

This article explores the possibility of Indemonstrable Faith within the framework of David Hume’s philosophy and seeks to show that the collapse of rationalist theology in his system does not necessarily entail the complete elimination of religion. The central question of the article is whether Hume’s critique of the epistemological and practical foundations of religion renders any form of faith impossible, or whether an alternative model of faith can still be meaningfully articulated. Employing an analytical–critical methodology and engaging with the tradition of British rationalist theology—particularly Samuel Clarke’s demonstrative system—the article argues that although Hume dismantles the four major pillars of Demonstrable Faith and evidentialist natural theology, he simultaneously opens the way for a psychological, nature based, and non-cognitivist understanding of religious faith. According to the thesis developed here, religious faith in Hume’s framework is not a demonstrable or evidentially grounded belief, but rather a natural propensity, an existential response to uncertainty, and a phenomenon rooted in human emotions and the cognitive mechanisms of the mind. The article concludes that Hume’s thought allows for a naturalistic, Indemonstrable model of faith—one that mediates between his radical critique of traditional theology and the enduring human need for meaning, thereby offering a renewed horizon for contemporary philosophy of religion.

Keywords

Main Subjects

Metaphysics

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 14 January 2026

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History

  • Receive Date: 18 August 2025
  • Revise Date: 08 January 2026
  • Accept Date: 14 January 2026

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