Inexplicable Disagreement and the Rationality of Religious Belief: A Critical Analysis of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Theory

Articles in Press

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Department of Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, Faculty of Religions and Islamic Studies, International University of Islamic Denominations

10.22108/mph.2026.147114.1673

Abstract

The problem of religious disagreement remains one of the most profound challenges in contemporary epistemology of religion. Nicholas Wolterstorff, a leading figure in analytic philosophy of religion, offers a distinctive response to this problem grounded in the concepts of inexplicable disagreement, epistemic entitlement, and trust in cognition. His approach, which stands in contrast to Lockean evidentialism and contemporary conciliationism, seeks to preserve the rationality of religious belief even in the face of peer disagreement. Wolterstorff argues that many deep and persistent disagreements in philosophy, religion, and ethics are “inexplicable” and cannot be reduced to error or negligence. Thus, mere awareness of such disagreement does not necessarily mandate suspension of belief. If a believer has fulfilled all their “epistemic duties” in forming a belief, they remain entitled to hold it despite peer disagreement. This paper reconstructs and critically evaluates Wolterstorff’s view along four key axes: epistemic, methodological, virtue-theoretic, and socio-normative. It shows that while his theory represents a significant advance in reconceiving rational religious belief in a pluralistic world, it faces serious challenges concerning the role of higher-order evidence, the vagueness of entitlement, the risk of “virtue-cloaked dogmatism,” and the difficulty of bridging personal and public rationality. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for future development and argues that Wolterstorff’s project opens a promising middle path between conciliationist skepticism and traditionalist dogmatism.

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Metaphysics

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 25 January 2026

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History

  • Receive Date: 19 October 2025
  • Revise Date: 18 January 2026
  • Accept Date: 25 January 2026

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