Is Divine Providence in Avicenna's Metaphysics a Theological Concept?

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Philosophy Department, faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University

10.22108/mph.2024.143542.1606

Abstract

In this research, I will address two questions: what the concept of Divine Providence in Avicenna's metaphysics is not, and in relation to what issue it should be understood. I will respond to the first question by stating that Divine Providence, according to Avicenna, cannot have the same meaning as in traditional theism, which, based on the assumption of the three absolute attributes—omniscience, omnipotence, and absolute goodness for God—attributes a form of care or concern for His creatures to Him. In fact, Avicenna denies both the concern for the other-than-God for the First Principle and the conventional meanings of these three attributes for the First Cause. The answer to the second question will be that Divine Providence, both in the historical context of this concept in Peripatetic philosophy and in the context of Avicenna's statements in the Metaphysics of the Healing, is a response to the issue of explaining the order of the universe. I will show that by rephrasing the concept of Divine Providence, Avicenna's metaphysics no longer faces challenges such as the problem of evil, which traditional theism encounters.

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 28 December 2024
  • Receive Date: 01 December 2024
  • Revise Date: 24 December 2024
  • Accept Date: 28 December 2024