Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1
Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
2
PhD Candidate in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
10.22108/mph.2025.144373.1625
Abstract
According to Kyle Stanford’s argument against scientific realism, “New Induction”, past scientists were unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories; therefore, present scientists are also unable to conceive of alternatives to their chosen theories. Consequently, present scientific theories, chosen without considering the alternatives, are not believable. In response to Stanford, Moti Mizrahi argues that since this approach can be extended to philosophers and philosophical theories as well, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. This is because, parallel to the problem of unconceived alternatives, there exists a similar problem in philosophy, called “unconceived objections”: past philosophers were unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories; therefore, present philosophers are also unable to conceive of serious objections to their chosen theories. Consequently, present philosophical theories, chosen without considering the objections, are not believable. Hence, Stanford’s argument, being a philosophical view, is not believable either.
In this article, after explaining Mizrahi’s strategy, we will examine and evaluate the coherence and effectiveness of such a strategy. Our objective is to determine whether Mizrahi’s response can truly withstand potential criticisms and plausibly counter Stanford’s argument against scientific realism. The arguments and findings of this study indicate a positive answer to this question.
Keywords
Main Subjects
)