نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
فارغالتحصیل دکتری فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The primary aim of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is to explore the nature of a happy life. Aristotle approaches the definition of happiness twice, each time in two different but interconnected ways. In the first book, he defines happiness as a life in accordance with human virtue—a virtue stemming from the core function of humans, which is reason. However, by adding the qualification “an aspect that falls under reason,” he includes civic virtues as part of the essential functions of human existence. Additionally, he introduces external conditions, such as good fortune, virtuous friends, and wealth, as prerequisites for achieving happiness. The virtues required for this kind of happiness are those realized within the city and are dependent on the city’s accepted nomoi (laws), thus binding them to political matters. Consequently, it appears that the definition of happiness and the articulation of virtues in the first nine books of Ethics are meaningful within a political context. However, in Book X, Aristotle shifts his tone, defining happiness as a life in accordance with reason, specifically contemplation. This life is no longer bound by action, political virtues, or external conditions. This shift has led some modern interpreters of Aristotle to view Book X as conflicting with the earlier books and unrelated to them. This article aims to demonstrate that Aristotle’s change in tone serves to reveal the tension between philosophical and political life, while also showing that the philosophical life, despite this tension, retains a hidden connection to political life
کلیدواژهها [English]
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